While researching for my two recent books, A Moment of Madness and The Unravelling, I uncovered a wealth of remarkable historical details. Some of these made their way into the books, but many others did not. This blog is an opportunity to share one such fascinating aspect which was omitted from both books.
If I were to ask readers of this blog who they think was the most influential American figure in shaping U.S. policy toward Rhodesia's white minority government in the 1970s, most would likely answer Henry Kissinger without hesitation. But how many would name Andrew Jackson Young?
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A Surprising Perspective
In my research, I came across a compelling interview with Andrew Young, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under President Jimmy Carter, conducted by The Times of London. Young offered a striking perspective on Robert Mugabe, then a prominent nationalist leader:
Interviewer: “Does Mr. Mugabe strike you as a violent man?”
Young: “Not at all, he’s a very gentle man. In fact, one of the ironies of the whole struggle is that I can’t imagine Joshua Nkomo or Robert Mugabe ever pulling the trigger on a gun to kill anyone. I doubt that they ever have. … The violent people are Smith’s people, and hopefully they won’t be around for the new Zimbabwe.”
In another moment, Young described Mugabe as intelligent, dedicated, and incorruptible:
Young: “The only thing that frustrates me about Robert Mugabe is that he is so damned incorruptible. … The problem is he was educated by the Jesuits, and when you get the combination of a Jesuit and a Marxist kind of philosophy merging in one person, you’ve got a hell of a guy to deal with.”
These comments reveal much about Young’s perspective on Rhodesian black nationalist leaders and his significant role in reshaping U.S. policy.
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U.S. Policy in the 1970s: Kissinger’s Pragmatism and Young’s Moral Vision
During the 1970s, the United States played a pivotal role in pressuring Rhodesia’s white minority government, led by Ian Smith, to accept majority rule. This effort evolved under two administrations, driven by key figures: Henry Kissinger, Andrew Young, and President Jimmy Carter. Their combined influence helped steer Rhodesia toward the eventual transition to Zimbabwe.
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Henry Kissinger’s Cold War Strategy (1976)
As Secretary of State under President Gerald Ford, Kissinger adopted a pragmatic, Cold War-focused approach to the Rhodesian crisis. Concerned about the Soviet Union’s growing influence in Southern Africa through its support of liberation movements, Kissinger sought to pre-empt further instability by advocating a controlled transition to majority rule.
The Kissinger Plan: In 1976, Kissinger brokered a diplomatic initiative involving South African Prime Minister John Vorster, pressuring Ian Smith to accept the principle of one-man-one-vote. This phased plan proposed a Western-managed constitutional transition.
Challenges: Despite securing Smith’s grudging acceptance, the Plan ultimately failed due to resistance from African nationalist leaders, who mistrusted Western mediation, and from hardliners within Smith’s government.
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The Carter Administration’s Shift (1977–1980)
The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 marked a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy. Carter prioritised human rights and decolonisation, diverging from Kissinger’s realpolitik approach. Under his administration, Andrew Young became a pivotal figure in advancing these principles.
Carter’s Leadership: The administration intensified support for U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia, further isolating Ian Smith’s government.
Young’s Advocacy: As U.N. Ambassador, Young championed African liberation movements, vocally supporting leaders like Robert Mugabe (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU). Unlike Kissinger, Young recognised these leaders as the legitimate representatives of Rhodesia’s black majority.
Young’s moral stance framed Rhodesia’s racial policies as indefensible and emphasised the need for global support for decolonisation. He also lobbied South Africa to withdraw its backing for the Rhodesian regime, undermining Smith’s position.
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Legacy and Reflection
The contrasting approaches of Kissinger and Young reflect the complexity of U.S. foreign policy during the Rhodesian crisis. Kissinger’s pragmatic Cold War focus prioritised regional stability, while Young’s moral vision underscored the injustices of minority rule and highlighted the aspirations of African liberation leaders. Together, these efforts laid the groundwork for the Lancaster House negotiations of 1979 and Rhodesia’s eventual transition to Zimbabwe in 1980.
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Fundamental Miscalculations in U.S. Policy
While U.S. efforts succeeded in ending Rhodesia’s white minority rule, several miscalculations became apparent in Zimbabwe’s post-independence years:
1. Overestimating Mugabe’s Leadership: U.S. policymakers, including Andrew Young, portrayed Mugabe as incorruptible and committed to democratic principles. Mugabe’s authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement later proved otherwise.
2. Ignoring Tribal Divisions: The U.S. failed to fully grasp the ethnic tensions between Shona and Ndebele groups, which contributed to post-independence conflicts like Gukurahundi.
3. Neglecting Economic Transition: While focused on political liberation, U.S. policy offered little support for Zimbabwe’s economic restructuring, leaving the new government to grapple with land and wealth inequalities.
4. Limited Follow-Through: The U.S. did not sustain its support post-independence, allowing Zimbabwe’s fledgling democracy to falter without meaningful intervention.
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A Final Thought
One wonders how Zimbabwe’s history might have unfolded if Jimmy Carter had not won the 1976 U.S. presidential election. It is remarkable that the influence of one man, namely Andrew Jackson Young, was so profound.
Would Kissinger’s gradualist approach have prolonged Rhodesia’s minority rule, or could it have fostered a more stable transition?
While I doubt that white-minority rule would have endured under any scenario after 1980, it is possible that under a different American administration, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s Internal Settlement of 1979 could have garnered greater international support thereby providing a more inclusive path forward for Prime Minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa's government of national unity.
Who knows? What is certain, however, is that few could have foreseen just how disastrously things would eventually turn out.
We all weep for our beloved Zimbabwe.
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